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We show that among workers whose network is weaker than formal (non-
network) channels, those finding a job through the network should have higher 
wages than those finding a job through formal channels. Moreover, this wage 
differential is decreasing in network strength. We test these implications using a 
survey of recent immigrants into Canada. At least at the lower end of an 
individual’s wage distribution above his reservation wage, finding a network job is 
associated with higher wages for those with weak networks, and the interaction 
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This paper examines the role played by social networks in the job search process of 
recent immigrants. Participants in the labour market do not have complete information. 
In particular, job seekers do not know about all existing job vacancies that may 
potentially be good matches. In this context, social networks may provide a valuable 
informational resource. In fact, one would expect the problem of information scarcity to 
be more severe for new immigrants. For example, new immigrants may face language 
barriers that hinder access to information from formal/non-network sources. It is then 
natural for them to rely on people they know for information about potential jobs.  
 
In examining the role played by social networks in influencing the labour market 
outcomes of immigrants, the existing literature has mainly looked at the effects of living 
in ethnic enclaves. The underlying belief is that social networks among immigrants are 
likely to be larger within ethnic enclaves. Except for unusual circumstances such as 
refugee programs that randomly assign immigrants to their locality, it is typically difficult 
to assess the effect of living in an enclave on immigrant outcomes. If booming 
communities attract many immigrants, it will appear that immigrants do better if they 
move where there are lots of immigrants. On the other hand, if, for example, immigrants 
with poor knowledge of the host country language tend to move to immigrant enclaves, 
it may appear that enclaves hurt immigrants.  
 
In contrast with this literature, although we also examine the role of network/enclave 
size, we focus on the effect of network strength. In our theoretical section, strong 
networks are those with a high probability of producing a job offer. In our empirical work, 
we show that an immigrant who settles near a relative or friend on arrival in Canada is 
more likely to find a job through a network. We define a strong social tie as the 
presence, upon arrival, of at least one relative or friend in the locality where the recent 
immigrant initially settled and use this variable to capture network strength. 
 
We develop a theoretical model that shows that among workers whose network is 
stronger than formal (non-network) channels (i.e. the offer arrival rate from networks is 
greater than from formal channels), those who find a job through the network should 
have lower wages than those who find a job through formal channels, and this wage 
differential is predicted to be increasing in absolute value in network strength. The 
empirical strategy focuses on this interaction between network strength and job-finding 
method. This approach greatly mitigates the problem of omitted variables bias which, as 
discussed above, typically plagues studies that try to examine network-size effects.  
 
We combine census data with the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants into Canada, a 
nationally representative sample of recent immigrants arriving in Canada between 
October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001. We use these data to examine the role 
played by strong social ties in the job search of these new immigrants entering the 
Canadian labour market.  
 The presence of a strong social tie is significantly associated with finding a job through 
the network (but only insignificantly with finding a job) suggesting that this variable is a 
good proxy for network strength. We also find that larger networks/enclaves are 
associated with a higher probability of finding both network and formal jobs although 
these effects dissipate within a few years after the immigrants’ arrival, and we have 
already noted the need for caution in interpreting this correlation. 
  
Strong networks are also associated with higher wages at the lower end of an 
immigrant’s wage distribution but have only a modest relation to their overall wage. If we 
compare two otherwise similar groups of recent immigrants, the group with strong ties 
earns a statistically insignificant 5.6% more, on average. However, the 25th percentile 
of the strong network group’s wage distribution is 9.4% higher and the median is 4.7% 
higher. Again, it is not clear whether this relation is causal although the result is 
consistent with the expectation that immigrants with stronger ties will have higher 
wages. 
 
The main innovation in the research is our examination of wages conditional on whether 
the immigrant found a job through a network or more formal means and to use the 
results to assess the importance of strong social ties. In the absence of strong social 
ties, those finding their first jobs through networks have weekly wages that are similar to 
those finding them through formal means. With strong networks, as predicted, those 
finding their jobs through the network have lower wages compared to those finding them 
through formal means, but the difference is small and again statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, there is an important effect at the lower end of an individual’s potential wage 
distribution. If we compare two otherwise similar groups of recent immigrants, both of 
whom do not have strong network ties, the 25
th percentile of the group finding its job 
through the network earns 17.2 percent more than the same percentile of those doing 




percentile wages) for those with strong ties, those who are in network jobs earn a wage 
that is only 0.8 percent higher compared to those who obtained jobs through formal 
channels. Thus, at this level, the network premium (network-formal wage differential) is 
16.4 percent lower for those with strong social ties compared to the network premium 
for immigrants without these ties.  
Therefore the network premium is decreasing in network strength as predicted by the 
theoretical model, suggesting that at this end of the wage distribution the presence of a 
strong social tie increases the offer arrival rate of jobs from the network. We interpret 
this as suggesting that, everything else equal, new immigrants with strong ties are more 
likely than are immigrants without such ties, to receive an offer through their network. 
However, relative to weak ties, strong ties do not increase or decrease the arrival rate of 
network jobs at the upper end of the immigrant's potential wage distribution, only at the 
lower end of this distribution.  
     
It is often argued that immigrants tend to cluster together because the presence of 
established immigrants facilitates assimilation of new arrivals, both in the labour market 
and in the social environment of the host country. We find that social networks help in the economic assimilation of recent immigrants. Our findings suggest that immigrants 
with strong social ties in their localities enjoy a faster arrival rate of jobs, at least at the 
lower end of their wage distribution. Our paper does not address other issues related to 
immigrant dispersion, including the longer-term labour market effects of immigrant 
enclaves. 1 Introduction
Participants in the labor market do not have complete information. In particular, job seek-
ers do not have information about all existing job vacancies that may potentially be good
matches. In this context, social networks may provide a valuable source of information. In
fact one would expect the problem of information scarcity to be more severe for new immi-
grants. For example, new immigrants may face language barriers that hinder their access
to information through formal/non-network sources. It is then natural for them to rely on
people they know for information about potential jobs. In this paper we examine the role
played by social networks in the job search of recent immigrants. We develop a theoretical
model that brings out the importance of strong social ties in the host country and then test
the implications of the model using a nationally representative survey of recent immigrants
to Canada.
In examining the e⁄ects of social networks on labor market outcomes of recent immigrants,
the existing literature has mainly looked at the e⁄ects of living in ethnic enclaves, suggest-
ing an underlying belief that social networks among immigrants may be stronger in ethnic
enclaves. There is less agreement about how enclaves a⁄ect immigrants in the labor market.
An important channel by which enclaves in￿ uence economic assimilation is by providing their
members with a self-contained labor market. There are many reasons why employers within
an enclave may prefer to hire individuals from their own country (Borjas 2000). By employ-
ing their compatriots, frictions at work arising from di⁄erences in language and work habits
are reduced. Further, employees may also have a better understanding of consumers￿tastes
within the enclave, which may help the ￿rm to better serve its market. On the other hand,
by providing jobs targeted towards its members and steering them into certain occupations,
enclaves may limit their search horizons. They could therefore preclude jobs in the broader
labor market, that may have been better matches. Living in an enclave may also be associ-
ated with a lower rate of acquisition of host country skills, e.g. language, which may reduce
the chances of moving to better jobs ((Lazear 1999) and (Berman, Lang, and Siniver 2003)).
Furthermore, according to the human capital externalities model, the e¢ ciency of segregation
depends on the quality of the enclave, i.e. the stock of human capital ((Edin, Fredriksson,
and Aslund 2003), (Borjas 1992) and (Borjas 1995)). For example, if skilled members of an
ethnic group live together, then newcomers may bene￿t from interacting with other settled
members of their group while the opposite may be true if unskilled members congregate in the
same geographic area. Thus, the e⁄ect of living in an enclave on immigrants￿labor market
experience is ambiguous and needs to be examined empirically.
The main problem encountered in trying to estimate the causal e⁄ect of networks is one
of omitted variables bias. First, there may be unobserved factors that make members of a
particular country more suitable for certain jobs and/or there may be location speci￿c factors
that result in good labor market outcomes. For example, new immigrants to areas where
existing immigrants have a low unemployment rate may also have a low unemployment rate,
not because the existing immigrants are better able to help the new arrivals, but because labor
market conditions are generally favorable there. Second, there may be important unmeasured
di⁄erences between individuals who choose to locate near other members of their ethnic group
and those who do not.
Some papers have addressed omitted variables bias by using instrument variable tech-
1niques for network characteristics. Munshi (2003) studies Mexican migrants in the United
States. He proxies the individual￿ s network by the proportion of the sampled individuals from
his community who are located in the U.S. in that year. To avoid endogeneity problems, he
uses lagged rainfall in the origin-community as an instrument for the size of network at the
destination. He ￿nds that the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a
higher paying non-agricultural job when his network is exogenously larger. Edin, Fredriks-
son, and Aslund (2003) study the e⁄ects of ethnic enclaves on earnings using data from an
immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government authorities distributed refugee im-
migrants across locales based on the availability of housing. They argue that this provides
a natural experiment which allows them to estimate the causal e⁄ect of living in enclaves.
They instrument current location attributes with attributes of the initial assigned location
and ￿nd that enclaves improve labor market outcomes for less skilled immigrants. Although
these papers have e⁄ectively addressed the endogeneity of network characteristics, their re-
sults are speci￿c to their contexts, namely Mexican immigrants to the United States and
refugees in Sweden, both quite atypical immigrants, and may not extend to other scenarios.
In this paper we examine the importance of networks using a nationally representative
sample of recent immigrants to Canada. The social network of a recent immigrant can be
characterized in many ways. Here we use two variables to capture the network structure.
The ￿rst is network strength, indicated by the presence of at least one relative or friend
in the recent immigrant￿ s area of residence in Canada, just at the time of arrival.1 The
second is network size, measured by the share of the local area population from his country
of birth. The use of the network strength variable is a novel approach and captures network
in￿ uence arising from the presence of at least one strong social tie close by. Network size
captures the in￿ uence of weak/potential social ties or the enclave e⁄ect. We study the e⁄ect
of these dimensions of network structure on the recent immigrant￿ s labor market outcomes.2
This is done in two steps. First we adopt a di⁄erence in di⁄erences approach to estimate
the network e⁄ect. This approach addresses some of the bias arising from unobservable
group/location characteristics, but may still su⁄er from bias arising mainly due to individual
speci￿c unobservables. We undertake this exercise mainly because it directly estimates the
network e⁄ect and permits comparison of our results with the existing literature.
In the next step we empirically test the implications of the theoretical model developed
here. The model shows that among workers whose network is stronger than formal channels
are (in other words whose network provides a greater probability of an o⁄er than do formal
channels), those who ￿nd a job through the network should have lower wages than those
who ￿nd a job through formal channels, and this wage di⁄erential is decreasing in absolute
1For our empirical estimates it is important that the recent immigrant is asked about the presence of a strong social
tie in his neighborhood, just upon arrival. This makes network strength exogenous to his subsequent labor market
experience.
2Discussion about the nature of network ties that help ￿nd jobs has its origins in sociology. Granovetter (1973) de￿nes
the strength of a tie as a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy and the reciprocal
services which characterize the tie. This is a very intuitive de￿nition and captures the closeness of an interpersonal
relationship. Bridges and Villemez (1986) and Marsden and Hurlbert (1988) ￿nd evidence that, after controlling for
worker characteristics, there is no signi￿cant relation between strength of tie used to ￿nd the job and the wage in the
job. These papers have focused on the relation between the type of tie actually used to locate a job and the job￿ s
characteristics. The ￿ networks as resources￿argument made by Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert (1986) suggests that
the entire network structure may be the crucial independent variable and must be taken into account when attempting
to examine the e⁄ect of social networks on labor market outcomes.
2value in network strength. Our empirical strategy tests the latter implication by using the
interaction between network strength and job ￿nding method. We overcome the omitted
variables problem by focussing on this interaction term.
We ￿nd that a stronger network helps a recent immigrant ￿nd his ￿rst job through his
social network. A larger network is associated with a higher probability of ￿nding a job
and also a higher probability of ￿nding the ￿rst job using the social network, but the e⁄ects
of network size are small in magnitude. The di⁄erence in di⁄erences approach provides
some evidence of a positive relation between wages and network strength and little evidence
of a network size e⁄ect. When the di⁄erence in di⁄erences model is augmented with an
interaction between job ￿nding method and network strength, we ￿nd that the implications
of the theoretical model are con￿rmed for jobs at the lower end of an individual￿ s acceptable
wage distribution (i.e. wage distribution above his reservation wage). At this end of his
wage distribution, ￿nding a network job is associated with higher wages for those with weak
networks. Also, the interaction between network strength and ￿nding a job through the
network is negative, suggesting that at the lower end of his acceptable wage distribution,
the presence of at least one strong social tie in his neighborhood upon arrival increases the
number of job o⁄ers he receives from his network.
In section 2 we develop a theoretical model of networks and derive its implications. Section
3 describes the empirical framework. In section 4 we provide a brief description of the data.
The main empirical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 gives the conclusions.
2 THEORETICAL MODEL
The model draws heavily on Montgomery (1992). The key result regarding the expected
wage conditional on job-￿nding method can be found there in general form by translating
variables appropriately.
Consider a recent immigrant looking for jobs. He faces two sources of job o⁄ers, the
network source, and the formal/non-network source. Suppose that with probability pn he
receives an o⁄er through the network, and with probability pf he receives a job o⁄er through
the formal source. Also assume that he can receive at most one o⁄er from each source. In
each case, the wage o⁄er for the job is drawn from a common distribution, with distrib-
ution function F(w). Thus, the assumption here is that the distribution of wage o⁄ers is
independent of the source. Also assume that immigrants are homogenous in their skill level.
The model is set in discrete time and there is a single time period. The immigrant worker
accepts an o⁄er if he receives at least one o⁄er greater than his reservation wage. If he receives
two o⁄ers, he chooses the higher o⁄er, provided that it is higher than his reservation wage.
For the moment, there is no loss in generality in treating wage o⁄ers below the reservation
wage as non-o⁄ers, and de￿ning F(w) over the range of wages greater than the reservation
wage, and pn and pf as the probabilities of receiving an o⁄er greater than this cuto⁄.
2.1 Network Strength
With probability (1￿pn)￿(1￿pf), the worker receives no o⁄ers, with probability (1￿pn)￿pf,
he receives only a formal o⁄er, with probability pn￿(1￿pf), he receives only a network o⁄er,
and with probability pn ￿ pf, he receives both types of o⁄ers.
3The expected wage conditional on receiving at least one job o⁄er is
E(w) =
(pf + pn ￿ 2pfpn)E(wjN = 1) + pfpnE(wjN = 2)
(pf + pn ￿ pfpn)
(1)
where N is the number of job o⁄ers received. It is straightforward to show that E(w) is
increasing in pn (and pf), provided that the expected wage is increasing in the number of
o⁄ers, which it will be if the distribution of o⁄ers is nondegenerate.
What about wages conditional on the method through which the job was found? The
expected wage conditional on accepting a job through the network is,
E(wjn) = (1 ￿ pf)E(wjN = 1) + pfE(wjN = 2) (2)
which is independent of pn:
The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through the formal source is,
E(wjf) = (1 ￿ pn)E(wjN = 1) + pnE(wjN = 2) (3)
which is also increasing in pn.
It follows immediately that the gap between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a
job through the network and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the
formal mechanism is decreasing in network strength, as de￿ned by pn.
Finally, consider the level of the di⁄erence in earnings conditional on job ￿nding method:
E(wjn) ￿ E(wjf) = (pf ￿ pn)(E(wjN = 2) ￿ E(wjN = 1)): (4)
The sign of this di⁄erence depends on the relative probability of ￿nding a job through the
formal method and the network. If the network is less likely to produce a job than the formal
source (pn < pf), then workers who ￿nd jobs through networks will have higher wages, on
average, than those who ￿nd them through formal methods. Note that, if the network is more
likely to produce a job than the formal source, then those ￿nding jobs through networks
will have lower wages vis-￿-vis those ￿nding them through formal methods. This is the key
insight in Montgomery (1992).
The intuition for this counterintuitive result is relatively straightforward, especially in
the case of one contact of each type. To explain the intuition consider an extreme example.
Suppose, in a given time period, the network almost never generates a job o⁄er (pn is close
to 0) while formal search almost always yields an o⁄er (pf is close to 1). In this scenario,
almost all recent immigrants receive an o⁄er from the formal source while very few receive
an o⁄er from the network. Therefore, those who accepted network jobs most likely chose
between two o⁄ers, while those who accepted formal jobs, almost all chose the one o⁄er they
had. Therefore, those in network jobs have higher wages compared to those in formal jobs,
even though the network is weaker than the formal source.
The result on the sign of the di⁄erence in earnings conditional on job ￿nding method is
sensitive to the assumption that the distribution of wages is the same for the two job sources.
When the network distribution stochastically dominates, or is a mean preserving spread of
the formal distribution, it is more likely that expected wage conditional on ￿nding the job
through the network is higher than expected wage conditional on ￿nding the job through the
formal source irrespective of the relation between pn and pf:3
3However, in a slightly di⁄erent context, Montgomery (1992) provides examples to show that even when both sources
42.2 Di⁄ering Wage Distributions
Let the distribution of wages received through the network conditional on receiving an o⁄er
be Fn(w), and similarly, the distribution of the formal wages conditional on receiving an o⁄er
be Ff(w).
The expected wage conditional on receiving a job o⁄er is,
E(w) =
pf(1 ￿ pn)E(wf) + pn(1 ￿ pf)E(wn) + pfpnE(wjN = 2)
(pf + pn ￿ pfpn)
: (5)
As before, improvements in the strength of either the formal or network domains will raise
expected wages.
The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through a network is,
E(wjn) =
(1 ￿ pf)E(wn) + pfE(wnjwn > wf)P(wn > wf)
1 ￿ pf + pfP(wn > wf)
(6)
which, as in the simpler model, is independent of pn.
The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through formal means is,
E(wjf) =
(1 ￿ pn)E(wf) + pnE(wfjwf > wn)P(wf > wn)
1 ￿ pn + pnP(wf > wn)
(7)
which, as before, is increasing in pn. Therefore, it continues to be true that the gap between
the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network and the expected wage
conditional on ￿nding a job through formal mechanisms, is decreasing in network strength,
as de￿ned by pn.
In sum, in the simple case of one o⁄er from each source, the model has the following pre-
dictions regarding network strength, (the probability of ￿nding the job through the network):
1. The expected wage is increasing in network strength.
2. If the distribution of wage o⁄ers in the formal and network sectors are identical, the
expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network is higher than the
expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through formal methods if and only if pn <
pf.
3. The di⁄erence between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the
network and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through formal methods,
is decreasing in network strength.
In this simple case, implications (1) and (3) hold even when the network distribution is
not the same as the distribution of formal job o⁄ers.
are equally strong and the network distribution stochastically dominates or is a mean preserving spread of the formal
distribution, expected wage conditional on network job could be lower than expected wage conditional on formal job.
Thus, the sign of the di⁄erence in expected wage conditional on job ￿nding method can go in either direction when the
network and formal distributions are di⁄erent.
52.3 Multiple Contacts
The model of network strength developed above can be looked at as the reduced form of a
more complicated model in which individuals have multiple formal and network contacts. In
this case, pn and pf are the probabilities of getting at least one o⁄er through network and
formal contacts, respectively.
Consider the following simpli￿ed version of Montgomery￿ s model. An individual has N
network contacts to jobs and M formal contacts. As before, the probability that each contact
produces an o⁄er is given by, pn and pf, and conditional on an o⁄er, wages are drawn inde-
pendently from a distribution F(w): Then, the probability that a contact of type i produces
a wage of no more than w is,
￿i(w) = 1 ￿ pi(1 ￿ F(w)) (8)




The densities of accepted network and formal wages are given by,
hn(w) = Npnf(w)H(w)=￿n (10)
hf(w) = Mpff(w)H(w)=￿f (11)



















where wr is the reservation wage, and D(w) ￿
f(w)H(w)
￿n . Similarly, the expected wage



































Such a ￿￿ exists, and is unique, if ￿n
￿f is monotonic in w.

















1 ￿ pn(1 ￿ F(w))
1 ￿ pf(1 ￿ F(w))
￿￿ ￿ R(w); (19)
which is everywhere positive, and is decreasing in w if and only if pn < pf: Suppose that
this condition holds. By (17), R(w) < 1 for su¢ ciently high w and R(w) > 1 for su¢ ciently
low w. In e⁄ect, R(w) puts less weight to the density function for high values of w and
more weight for low values, meaning that the conditional distribution of the network wages
stochastically dominates that of the formal sector wages, and thus has a higher mean. The
opposite condition holds if pn > pf. Thus, even in the case of multiple contacts, implication
(2), listed in the end of sub-section 2.2, holds.
In the case of multiple contacts, a proof for the monotonicity result, namely, the di⁄erence
between the conditional wages is monotonic in pn, is not given. With multiple contacts, an
increase in the probability of getting an o⁄er through each member of the network will change,
not only the overall probability of getting an o⁄er, but also the distribution of the highest
wage o⁄er received through the network. Therefore, the proofs in sub sections 2.1 and 2.2
above, would not apply. However, the fact that when networks are stronger than formal
sources, conditional wages are higher for formal jobs than network jobs, and that, when
networks are weaker than formal sources, the opposite is true, reinforces the decision to focus
empirical work on the interaction between network strength and job-￿nding channel.
2.4 Endogenous Reservation Wages and Unemployment
Allowing for multiple periods, and therefore, endogenous reservation wages and unemploy-
ment duration, would further complicate the model. Following the standard sequential search
framework, it is imposed that the assumptions above apply in each period. In other words,
the worker receives an o⁄er through the network with probability pn, and this o⁄er is drawn
from a distribution Fn(w); and similarly for o⁄ers obtained through formal mechanisms.
Once the worker receives and accepts an o⁄er, there is no further search. The worker seeks to
maximize the present value of his lifetime earnings (or more generally utility, if there is value
to leisure). This framework ensures that the worker￿ s search strategy relies on the reservation
wage property. If a worker receives an o⁄er above his reservation wage in any period, he will
accept that o⁄er, unless he receives two o⁄ers that period, in which case he accepts the higher
o⁄er.
It is well known that in such models, the reservation wage is increasing in the arrival
frequency of o⁄ers, and that it increases as the o⁄er distribution shifts to the right. Under
special circumstances, the increase in the reservation wage engendered by an increase in the
o⁄er arrival rate can be su¢ cient to increase unemployment. Log concavity of the o⁄er
distribution is su¢ cient to eliminate this somewhat perverse result. However, here, there is a
mixture of o⁄er distributions, and there is no known intuitive condition which eliminates the
possibility that an increase in network strength, or the e⁄ectiveness of formal mechanisms,
7increases unemployment. Nevertheless, as discussed in Montgomery, one would generally
expect raising pn and/or pf to increase the employment rate.
The more serious problem is that raising the reservation wage can change the di⁄erence in
the expected wage from one and two o⁄ers in equation (4), or the equivalent in equations (7)
and (6). Therefore, the model cannot establish, as a theorem, that the wage di⁄erence be-
tween jobs obtained through formal mechanisms and networks, increases as network strength
grows. Nevertheless, it is expected that in practice this principal prediction will continue to
hold. The sample of immigrants is likely to have high discount rates, so that modest di⁄er-
ences in the arrival rate of o⁄ers will not have large e⁄ects on the reservation wage, and these
changes in the reservation wage will have still smaller e⁄ects on the expected wages obtained
through each mechanism.
3 Empirical Framework
There are many candidates for measures of network size and strength. Our empirical strategy
begins by verifying that the proposed measures of network strength and network size do
predict network use. Having validated these measures in this way, we then ask whether or
not these measures predict labor market outcomes. Finally, we examine whether network
strength interacts with network use as predicted by the theoretical model.
Validating the Network Measures: We propose that network size be measured by the log
of the share of working age population in the locality who are from the new immigrant￿ s
country of birth. Network strength is proxied by, whether or not the new immigrant had at
least one close friend or relative in the locality when he just arrived. The latent tendency to
￿nd a job through the social network is given by,
NJ￿
ijk = ￿1Fijk + ￿2Sjk + ￿Xijk + !1
j + ￿1
k + "ijk (20)
where, F is a dummy variable for having at least one friend/relative in the locality upon
arrival, S is the size variable, X is a set of additional controls that are likely to in￿ uence use
of social networks in ￿nding a job, and ! and ￿ are country of birth dummies and locality
dummies. The subscripts i;j and k; refer to individual i, country of birth j, and locality k.
When the sample is limited to individuals with jobs, (20) is estimated by probit. When
three choices (network job, formal job and unemployed) are allowed, a multinomial logit is
used.
Network Structure: Once the network measures are validated, we regress labor market
outcomes (time between arrival and ￿rst job, wage on ￿rst job, and di⁄erence in skills between
￿rst Canadian job and the job before migration) on the validated network measures, country
of birth dummies, locality dummies, and other controls that are likely to a⁄ect labor market
outcomes. This approach is given by,
Yijk = ￿1Fijk + ￿2Sjk + ￿Xijk + !2
j + ￿2
k + ￿ijk (21)
where Y is the relevant labor market outcome.
The model does not predict an unambiguous sign for the coe¢ cients on network para-
meters in explaining unemployment duration but it does predict that workers with better
networks will have higher wages.
8In part, we carry out this estimation to permit comparison of results with the existing
literature. The evidence on the e⁄ects of ethnic enclaves is mixed.4 As mentioned in the
introduction, there are arguments for both cases, namely that enclaves may bene￿t or hurt
immigrants. Also, various studies may not have fully addressed the omitted variables bias
issues that typically plague the estimation of network e⁄ects. Since we control for both loca-
tion and country of birth, our network measures are unlikely to be correlated with location
characteristics or group characteristics. Thus, ￿2 is a di⁄erence in di⁄erences estimator. It
is identi￿ed through variations in network size between, for example, Indians in Toronto and
Indians in Ottawa, and comparing this di⁄erence with variations in network size between the
Chinese across the same two cities. Bias of this form would arise only if Indian immigrants
were more likely than Chinese immigrants to locate in Toronto, because the industrial struc-
ture of the city bene￿ts Indians more than it does the Chinese immigrants. This cannot be
ruled out completely, but our greater concern is that where the immigrant locates may tell
us something about the immigrant: a Russian immigrant who locates where there are few
established Russian immigrants, may be quite di⁄erent from one who seeks out a Russian
immigrant enclave. Nevertheless, this approach is useful because it is straightforward and
addresses directly the e⁄ect of network structure on immigrant labor market outcomes.
Testing the Role of Networks: Our primary focus is to test whether the wage di⁄erence
between those who found their jobs using networks and those who found them using formal
mechanisms is related to the validated measure of network strength. The equation above is
augmented with an interaction between whether the individual found his ￿rst job through
the social network, and whether he had at least one friend or relative in the locality when he
￿rst arrived.
Wijk = ￿1Fijk + ￿2Sjk + ￿3NJijk + ￿4(NJijk ￿ Fijk) + ￿Xijk + !3
j + ￿3
k + ￿ijk (22)
where W is the wage in ￿rst job, and NJ is a dummy for whether the individual found his
￿rst job through the social network.
As explained in the theory section, when the immigrants￿networks are stronger than
formal channels (more likely to happen when they have a friend/relative close by), the e⁄ect
of ￿nding a job through the network should be negative, while when they are weaker, it should
be positive. However, as mentioned earlier this result could also be due to other factors, such
as, di⁄ering wage o⁄er distributions from the two sources. It is not possible to know what
drives the sign on ￿3. The testable implication of the model is that ￿4 is negative, that is
the di⁄erence between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network
and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the formal mechanism (in other
words the network premium), is decreasing in network strength.
An important advantage of this approach over the standard method of regressing labor
market outcomes on measures of network structure, is that it mitigates problems associated
with omitted variables. New immigrants are likely to share the unmeasured characteristics of
4Munshi (2003) and Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) ￿nd that networks improve the labor market outcomes
of Mexican immigrants to the United States and of refugees in Sweden. For three major cities in Canada, Hou and
Picot (2003) ￿nd only a weak e⁄ect of exposure to own-group neighbours on immigrants￿employment probability and
annual earnings. In contrast, Lazear (1999) argues that immigrant enclaves reduce the rate at which immigrants learn
the host-country language, while there is a large literature indicating that knowledge of host-country language raises
wages (see Berman, Lang, and Siniver, 2003, and the references therein).
9established immigrants. Thus, the outcomes of new and established immigrants are likely to
be positively correlated even if there is no causal relation. Similarly, if a locality is especially
conducive to good labor market outcomes for a particular immigrant group, this is likely
to generate a positive correlation between the outcomes of new and established immigrants.
In contrast, there is little reason to expect that, in areas where an immigrant group has
a particular advantage, or where the group is particularly favorably selected, the bias will
depend on the method through which the new immigrant ￿nds a job. It is even less reasonable
to anticipate that, the nature of the correlation is associated with the interaction of method
of job ￿nding and network strength. One would have to think of an unobservable that would
a⁄ect the network-formal wage di⁄erential di⁄erently for those with and without strong social
ties. The main motivation for including the interaction term comes from our theoretical model
and the prediction that it have a signi￿cant negative sign in equilibrium. Thus, our main
focus is to test the sign on ￿4.
4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Data
We use a 20% 2001 Census of Canada sample to calculate characteristics of immigrant pop-
ulations by country of origin and location within Canada. The sample is restricted to the
working age population (those between 24 and 64 years old). According to the 2001 Census,
immigrants constitute 18 percent of the Canadian population, and 21 percent of the labor
force. They come from more than 200 source countries. Source countries with fewer than
500 immigrants in the census sample are dropped, so that there are su¢ cient observations
in each cell to calculate network measures with reasonable precision. The geographical unit
used to characterize local networks is the Census Metropolitan Area, CMA, or the Census
Agglomeration, CA5 Using the 2001 Census, we calculate the share of working age population
in each CMA/CA from each source country, which is our measure of network size. Measures
of the wage distribution of the employed immigrant population from a particular country,
residing in a particular CMA/CA, are also obtained from the Census.
Our remaining data come from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC),
collected by Statistics Canada, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The LSIC sample
consists of immigrants who arrived in Canada between October 1, 2000 and September 30,
2001, and were 15 years or older. This population is referred to as recent immigrants. The
LSIC is a longitudinal survey with three waves: six months, two years and four years, since
arrival in Canada. It provides data on the recent immigrant￿ s characteristics, such as, sex,
age, education, languages spoken, country of birth and geographic location in Canada, and
also his job history, which includes labor force status, weekly wage if employed, etc. The
sample is restricted to those of working age, who are in the labor force. In the ￿rst wave, 74
percent of this age group were in the labor force. Individuals whose ￿rst job was arranged
5A census metropolitan area (CMA), or a census agglomeration (CA), is formed by one or more adjacent munici-
palities centered on a large urban area, known as the urban core. The census population count of the urban core is at
least 10,000 to form a census agglomeration, and at least 100,000 to form a census metropolitan area. To be included
in the CMA or CA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area,
as measured by commuting ￿ows derived from census place of work data. In the 2001 Census, there are 27 CMAs and
113 CAs across Canada.
10before they migrated to Canada, or who were either self employed, or in a family business6 are
dropped. Recent immigrants who move across CMA/CAs are also excluded.7 Observations
from CMA/CAs and from source countries with fewer than 10 immigrants in the LSIC sample,
and from source countries that are dropped from the census sample, are also excluded. The
￿nal wave one LSIC sample consists of 5123 recent immigrants, from 53 di⁄erent source
countries and residing in 16 di⁄erent CMA/CAs across Canada.8
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Although we drop a large number of countries and localities, the largest sending countries,
and the largest receiving localities, account for the vast majority of immigrants. The ￿rst
two columns of Table 1 show the twenty countries that have the largest shares of working
age immigrant population in Canada according to the 2001 Census. The top twenty source
countries constitute 68% of the working age immigrant population. Recent immigrants from
the above countries are more likely to have large social networks. Columns three and four
show the same information, but restrict the sample to immigrants who arrived after 1995.
The last two columns show the countries that contributed the largest in￿ ow of working age
immigrants as measured by the ￿rst wave of the LSIC. Together, these countries account
for 78% of working age immigrants arriving during this period. The table reveals the well-
documented increase in the share of immigrants from Asia, and the decline in the share from
Europe.
Table 2 shows that, the ￿ve largest CMAs (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa, Cal-
gary) have 52 percent of Canada￿ s working-age population, 75 percent of its working-age
immigrants and 83 percent of its recent working-age immigrants. Thus, recent immigrants
are settling in areas were there is an already large concentration of immigrants. For the
three largest source countries of recent immigrants, Table 3 shows the tendency of recent
immigrants to settle in areas with a large population of immigrants from their own country.
Table 4 shows the means for the variables in the ￿rst wave of the LSIC. By the time of
the ￿rst wave, 69 percent of the sample had held a ￿rst job. Of these, 42 percent reported
that they found this job through a friend or relative, which is de￿ned as a network job.
The remainder used other methods, such as, contacting the employer directly, responding to
newspaper advertisements, employment agencies, the internet, referral from another employer
or a union. These are referred to as formal jobs.
We proxy network strength by a binary variable. It takes the value 1, if the individual
reports that he already had at least one relative or friend in the city where he resides, when
he ￿rst arrived in Canada. While 89 percent had at least one relative or friend in Canada
on arrival, 82 percent have one in the city where they reside. By this measure, most recent
6In the ￿rst wave of the LSIC, 8.5 percent of the recent immigrants in the labor force are in pre-arranged jobs. 2.6
percent report being self-employed and 0.6 percent report being involved in a family business, when asked about their
￿rst jobs.
7A mover is dropped because it is not clear whether one should consider his network to be the relevant group in
the new location or in the old one. For example it could be the case that a person￿ s network in his previous location
helped him ￿nd a job in his current location. In this case, it would be incorrect to characterise the relevant group at
the current/interview location as his social network. In order to simplify matters and present clean results movers are
excluded from the sample. At the time of the ￿rst wave, 7.7 percent of recent immigrants in the labour force have
moved across CMA/CAs and are therefore dropped.
8Of the 16 CMA/CAs only one (Guelph) is a CA. Therefore, henceforth they will be referred to as CMAs.
11immigrants have strong networks.
We capture the size of the recent immigrant￿ s network by the natural logarithm of the
share of working age CMA population from his country of birth. Note that, since CMA
dummies are included, this is isomorphic to including the natural logarithm of the number
of immigrants from his country of birth.
Two things must be noted at this point. First, ￿nding the ￿rst job through the social
network does not necessarily imply the presence of a relative or friend in the same city of
residence on arrival. Immigrants may have found their ￿rst job through a friend made after
migrating to Canada, a relative or friend elsewhere, or through a compatriot who is not a
relative or friend known previously. Thus, having a network job does not imply having a
strong network. Second, to the extent that job search is complex, the dichotomous measure
of the ￿use of the social network￿and the theoretical concept it wishes to capture are not
perfectly correlated. For example, if a friend tells me that there are job openings where he
works, and I apply and get a job there, do I report that I found the job through a friend,
or that I applied directly to the employer? Thus, admittedly, the measure of use of network
(i.e. having a network job) is not perfect.
5 Results
5.1 Validating the Network Measures
Table 5 shows the relation between, the recent immigrant￿ s use of networks in ￿nding the ￿rst
job within six months (network job), and, the presence upon arrival of at least one friend or
relative in his locality (network strength). The ￿rst column shows that immigrants who have
at least one close friend or relative in their locality upon arrival are sixteen percentage points
more likely to ￿nd their ￿rst job through a network than are other immigrants. Controlling
for the percentage of established immigrants in the CMA from the person￿ s country of birth
(network size) has no e⁄ect (column (2)).
Column (3) controls for a large number of potential confounding factors, including locality
and country of birth. It shows that, conditional on having a job, the probability of having
a network job is 11 percentage points higher among those who had a friend or relative on
arrival, and does not show evidence of an e⁄ect of network size.
It is possible, although to us implausible, that strong ties increase the fraction of network
jobs among the employed by reducing the probability of a formal job and increasing the
probability of unemployment rather than by increasing the probability of holding a network
job. Therefore, in column (4) the sample is expanded to include those who have not found
a job within six months of arrival. Network strength continues to have a strong e⁄ect, and
now size has a positive e⁄ect as well, suggesting that network size in￿ uences job ￿nding. In
column (5), the dependent variable is "have a job." Here network size has a clear e⁄ect, but
strength does not. Columns (4) and (5) together suggest that strong ties largely substitute
network jobs for formal jobs.
To address this more directly, in columns (6) and (7), we present the results of a multino-
mial logit, where the three outcomes are, having a formal job (FJ), having a network job
(NJ), and the base category of being unemployed. Strength contributes to ￿nding a network
12job, while size contributes to ￿nding both types of jobs. Thus, table 5 validates the two
network variables as measures of the in￿ uence of networks in ￿nding ￿rst jobs.
Tables 6 and 7 replicate the exercise in table 5, but look at the relation between ￿nding
a network job and network strength, for ￿rst jobs found within two years and four years,
respectively.9 Once again, the presence of a relative or friend, is revealed as a good measure
of network in￿ uence in ￿nding jobs. These tables also reveal that, recent immigrants with a
high school or lower level of education are more likely to ￿nd their ￿rst jobs using networks,
while those with a university degree are less likely to use networks to do so (reference category
being immigrants with a college certi￿cate). This conforms to the notion that the low skilled
workers use networks much more than high skilled workers do.10 Surprisingly the tables also
show that university graduates are less likely to be employed. This could be because of more
competition among highly educated immigrants in the labor market.11 Also, immigrants
￿ uent in English are less likely to use networks in ￿nding their ￿rst jobs.
5.2 Importance of Network Measures over time
Section 5.1 validates the network measures of size and strength as good predictors of the use
of networks in ￿nding ￿rst jobs. At the six month interview, conditional on employment,
42 percent of the recent immigrants report that they found their current or most recent job
using networks. Again, conditional on employment, at the two year interview this ￿gure is 41
percent, and at the four year interview it is 39 percent. Recent immigrants continue to use
networks to ￿nd jobs even after staying for four years in Canada. One question that comes to
mind is whether or not the network measures of size and strength continue to predict network
use over time.
Tables 8, 9 and 10 look at the current or most recent job at each interview, and replicate
tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Table 8 very closely resembles table 5. This is not surprising
because 87 percent of the current or most recent jobs, at the six month interview, were also
the ￿rst jobs. As in the case of ￿rst jobs, the presence of at least one close friend or relative
in the locality, predicts the use of networks in ￿nding the most recent job. The multinomial
logit results in column (5) show that the probability of ￿nding the current or most recent job
using the network is higher for those having a strong network. As in the case of ￿rst jobs,
a larger network size helps in ￿nding both formal and network jobs. Table 9 ￿nds similar
evidence for the importance of network strength in predicting the use of networks at the two
year interview. Finally, table 10 shows that, at the four year interview, both the measures of
network are no longer signi￿cant in explaining the use of networks in ￿nding jobs. However
9Statistics Canada estimates that in each wave less than 2 percent of the LSIC sample is no longer eligible because
sample members have either left Canada, died or been institutionalized. This allows us to add ￿rst jobs obtained after
the ￿rst wave to the wave one sample of ￿rst jobs without disrupting the nationally representative character of the LSIC
sample of recent immigrants.
10Departure from this conventional notion is examined in Saxenian (1999). The paper examines the extent to which
the skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants are organizing ethnic networks in California￿ s Silicon Valley to support
the often risky process of starting new technology businesses. The author notes that Silicon Valley￿ s new immigrant
entrepreneurs are more highly skilled than their counterparts in traditional industries, but like those counterparts they
have created a rich fabric of professional and associational activities that facilitate immigrant job search, information
exchange, access to capital and managerial know-how and the creation of shared ethnic identities.
11As table 4 shows, 70 percent of recent immigrants in our sample hold a university degree. Thus, most Canadian
immigrants today are highly educated. They may be competing for jobs amongst themselves, especially as ￿nding good
job matches takes longer for highly skilled workers.
13because of attrition between waves, the sample size declines dramatically from one wave to
the next. The coe¢ cients may be losing signi￿cance because of smaller sample size.
To check if smaller sample size is driving the results for current/recent jobs at the four year
interview, we carry out a robustness check by restricting the sample at the earlier interviews
(six months and two years) to only those present at the four year interview (results not shown
here). Network strength continues to predict ￿nding current/recent jobs using networks at
the six month and two year interviews, even when the sample is restricted as stated. Thus,
it seems to be the case that the measures of network structure used here do not e⁄ectively
capture network in￿ uence in ￿nding jobs during the third wave between two and four years
since arrival. This would be the case if the nature of networks changes with time spent in the
host country. This is likely to happen as the immigrant builds new friendships in the host
country.
5.3 Time to First Job
Table 11 shows the results from censored normal regressions for unemployment duration, or
equivalently, time between arrival and ￿nding the ￿rst job. A larger network is associated with
shorter unemployment duration: a ten percent increase in the share of the recent immigrant￿ s
country of birth population in total CMA working age population12 reduces unemployment
duration by about 1.6 percent. Given a median unemployment duration of 115 days13 at
six months, this translates to a reduction of less than two days. The covariates show some
interesting results. In the ￿rst six months, being female increases search time to ￿rst job by
almost 25 percent, and being married increases it by 10 percent. Unemployment duration is
reduced by 28 percent if the immigrant lived in Canada previously (as a non-tourist), and it
is increased by 47 percent if he is a refugee. Finally having a high school or lower level of
education reduces search time by 24 percent. This could be because of lower competition for
low skill jobs as compared to jobs requiring higher levels of education.
5.4 Network Structure and Wages
Column (1) of table 12 presents the results of an OLS (di⁄erence in di⁄erences) wage re-
gression with the network measures. It reveals a small negative and statistically insigni￿cant
e⁄ect of network size on earnings. This is consistent with larger networks being associated
with a faster arrival rate of o⁄ers (given the e⁄ect on unemployment duration found in table
11), but with either little or no e⁄ect on the reservation wage, or increasing the arrival rate
at the lower end of the wage distribution.
The presence of at least one relative or friend in the locality on arrival (network strength)
enters with the right sign, and has a nontrivial point estimate (over 5 percent), but does not
reach statistically signi￿cance at conventional levels.
12According to the 1996 census, the shares from China, India and Philippines, in Toronto￿ s working age population
were, 2.4 percent, 3.2 percent, and 2.5 percent, respectively. In 2001, these shares changed to, 3.4 percent, 4.2 percent,
and 2.5 percent, respectively; representing a 39 percent, 33 percent, and 17 percent change, in shares from China, India
and Philippines, in Toronto￿ s working age population.
13In calculating this ￿gure, recent immigrants who had not yet found a job since arrival, were given an unemployment
duration of 6 months, and were included in the calculation of the median. Also note that, 69% of recent immigrants in
the labor force were employed within six months since arrival.
14This ￿nding of an insigni￿cant e⁄ect of network size on earnings is consistent with previous
￿ndings for Canada. Hou and Picot (2003) examine the association between living in a visible
minority enclave and immigrants￿labor market outcomes in Canada￿ s three largest cities
and also ￿nd little association between exposure to own-group neighbors and immigrants￿
annual earnings. Since controls for language are included here, these results are not directly
comparable to Lazear (1999) in the United States, but they do not con￿rm an adverse e⁄ect
of ethnic enclaves. As discussed before, there are some endogeneity concerns that are not
addressed by the approach in table 12. Therefore, it is not clear whether these results di⁄er
from Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) because of di⁄erences in the nature of immigrants
to Sweden and Canada, or because of di⁄erences in approach.
The remaining columns present the results of quantile estimates. Because there is no
simple cluster correction for quantile estimates, a clustered bootstrap method is used to
calculate the standard errors. This approach is problematic because, since clusters rather
than observations are resampled, the number of observations can vary across replications,
and will typically be smaller than the number in the actual sample. This should, therefore,
produce upwards biased standard errors for the coe¢ cients of variables for which cluster has
little or no explanatory power. Therefore, the result of the cluster bootstrap is only reported
for network size, since it is measured at the level of the cluster, and ordinary standard errors
are reported for the remaining variables which are measured at the level of the individual.
Columns (2) - (4) present quantile regression results for wages, conditional on having a
wage. The results are similar to those obtained using OLS, although there is some evidence of
an even larger e⁄ect of network strength on initial wages at the 25th percentile, and this e⁄ect
is statistically signi￿cant at 0.1 level. A strong network results in a 9.4 percent increase in
wages in ￿rst jobs at the 25th percentile of an individual￿ s accepted wage o⁄er distribution.14
Columns (5) and (6) also include the unemployed immigrants (who are in the labor force)
by assigning them very low wages. It is not possible to estimate the model for the 25th
percentile because a high proportion of new immigrants are unemployed. There is continued
weak evidence of a positive e⁄ect of network strength on wages, in that the coe¢ cients are
statistically, but not numerically, insigni￿cant. The analysis is extended to include individuals
who found their ￿rst job after six months up to four years (tables 13 and 14). The results
are broadly similar. The e⁄ect of network strength is positive and statistically signi￿cant at
conventional levels for the 25th percentile of wages in ￿rst jobs (conditional on having a job)
obtained during the two year and four year periods.
However, as discussed above, the network structure approach is limited by the concern
that individuals who locate near friends or family, or in areas where their are an unusually
large number of established immigrants from their country of birth, di⁄er in unmeasured
ways from those who do not.15 Therefore, the paper turns to testing the prediction of the
theoretical model.
14Because there are controls for education the quantile regression results need to be interpreted carefully. The positive
e⁄ect of a stronger network does not bump up an individual￿ s position in the unconditional population wage distribution,
but results in a higher paying job at the 25th percentile of his conditional wage o⁄er distribution.
15Endogeneity of locating close to a friend or relative conditional on having one, does not seem to be a serious problem.
Fully 92 percent of the recent immigrants who had at least one relative or friend in Canada chose to live close to their
ties. One cannot completely rule out the possibility that individuals who choose to move to Canada without having
a friend or relative present are di⁄erent from other immigrants. However, we control for the presence of a relative or
friend in Canada but not in the same locality as the recent immigrant. Such immigrants do not di⁄er from those who
do not have a tie in Canada.
155.5 Augmented Wage Model
Table 15 shows the results for the wage equation with the method of ￿nding the ￿rst job
(whether or not it was found using the network) and the interaction between this variable
and network strength included in the regression.16 It is easy to tell stories in which the use of
a network is positively or negatively correlated with unobserved worker characteristics, but
less easy to explain why this correlation should be noticeably di⁄erent for those with and
without strong networks. Therefore, the paper￿ s primary focus is on the interaction term.
Column (1) shows that among those who did not have a friend or relative when they
￿rst arrived at their locality in Canada, ￿nding a job through a network is associated with a
trivial and statistically insigni￿cant 0.2 percent lower wage. In contrast, among those with a
friend or relative, the wage penalty associated with ￿nding a job through a network is about
3.2 percentage points higher although again not statistically signi￿cant.
Columns (2)-(4) present quantile regressions for the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles. As
in earlier tables, only the standard error for network size is adjusted for clustering. Only
column (2) pertaining to wages at the 25th percentile (of the conditional wage distribution)
conforms closely with the predictions of the theoretical model. For wages at the 50th and
75th percentile, the interaction term is negative, as predicted, but is small and statistically
insigni￿cant.
At the 25th percentile, among recent immigrants in formal jobs, those who have at least
one strong social tie in their locality earn a wage that is 12.8 percent higher compared to
those who do not have strong social ties. Again at this lower end of the individual wage
distribution, those with strong social tie(s) and in network jobs earn 13.6 (12.8+17.2-16.4)
percent higher wages compared to the omitted group of immigrants without strong social ties
and in formal jobs.
Also at the 25th percentile, in the absence of strong networks (strong social ties), those
￿nding their ￿rst jobs through networks have weekly wages that are 17.2 percent higher than
those doing so using formal means. In other words, at the lower end of the wage distribution,
among recent immigrants who do not have a strong social tie in their locality upon arrival,
those who are in network jobs earn a wage that is 17.2 percent higher compared to those who
obtained jobs through formal channels. The model predicts this di⁄erence if networks are
less likely to relay job o⁄ers than are formal methods (more likely to happen in the absence
of a relative or friend close by). However, as mentioned earlier, this ￿nding is also consistent
with other explanations such as unobserved di⁄erences between network users and non-users,
or di⁄erences between the network and formal wage o⁄er distributions. More importantly, as
predicted by the model, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and statistically
signi￿cant. For those who have a strong social tie, those who are in network jobs earn
a wage that in only 0.8 percent higher (17.2-16.4) compared to those who obtained jobs
through formal channels. In other words, for those who have at least one relative or friend in
their locality, the network premium (network-formal wage di⁄erential) is 16.4 percent lower
(network premium for those with strong networks is 0.8 percent) compared to the network
premium for immigrants without strong networks (network premium for those without strong
networks is 17.2 percent). Therefore the network premium is decreasing in network strength
16When interpreting the coe¢ cients on network strength, network job and their interaction, it should be noted that
the omitted group is that of immigrants in formal jobs and without strong social ties.
16as predicted by the theoretical model. The estimates are replicated by adding in workers who
found their ￿rst job after six months but within four years. As seen in tables 16 and 17, the
interaction term continues to be negative and signi￿cant albeit only at the .1 level in table
17.17
5.6 Skill in First Jobs
The LSIC asked recent immigrants about their occupation before coming to Canada. Those
without jobs were asked about their intended occupation in Canada. The LSIC reports an as-
sociated skill level based on the National Occupation Classi￿cation (NOC), which determines
skill level by the type and/or amount of training or education required for the work. It also
records respondents￿￿rst post-immigration occupation using the 1991 Standard Occupation
Classi￿cation Code (SOC). We established a concordance between the NOC and SOC codes,
which makes it possible to obtain the skill levels in the immigrant￿ s job just before migration,
and in his ￿rst job in Canada. About two-thirds of the sample pre-immigration or planned
jobs required the highest skill level. Of these, among those ￿nding jobs within six months,
73 percent took an initial Canadian job requiring a lower skill level. This raises concerns
about whether immigrant human capital is underutilized, and whether networks a⁄ect the
probability of such underutilization.
Table 18 presents probit estimates of the determinants of having a job with an appropriate
skill level for highly skilled immigrants who found a job in Canada within six months, two
years, and four years of arrival. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when the ￿rst job
is in the highest skill category and 0 otherwise. Network size and network strength do not
a⁄ect the probability of the ￿rst job being a highest skill job. As might be expected, for these
high-skill immigrants, being ￿ uent in English, having lived in Canada before as a non-tourist,
having an economic visa and being the principal applicant (as opposed to the dependent)
raise the probability of the ￿rst job in Canada being at the highest skill level.
If network and formal jobs are drawn from the same skill distribution, then the model
would produce results for skill similar to those obtained for wages. In table 19, the speci-
￿cation in table 18 is augmented with job ￿nding method and the interaction between job
￿nding method and network strength. Compared to those ￿nding jobs using formal means,
those ￿nding their ￿rst jobs through networks are more likely to be in jobs which underutilize
their skills. Network strength does not a⁄ect this result. This is consistent with the earlier
￿nding that, the principal e⁄ect of networks is to provide access to jobs at the lower end of
the individual￿ s wage (or skill) distribution.
6 Summary
We developed a theoretical model of the importance of networks for recent immigrants seeking
jobs and derived the equilibrium results for immigrants with strong and weak networks. The
model shows that among immigrants with networks that are stronger than formal channels,
17We also examined the network e⁄ect on wages by restricting the analysis to various sub-samples, according to
gender and education and to immigrants who belonged to countries where English was not the lingua franca. The
results were not demonstrably di⁄erent and no interesting patterns across sub-groups were observed, possibly because
standard errors get too large when sub-samples are used.
17those who are in network jobs have lower wages than those in formal jobs. It also predicts
that the network-formal wage di⁄erential is decreasing in network strength. These implica-
tions were tested using data on a nationally representative sample of recent immigrants into
Canada. The empirical strategy to carry out comparative statics, augments the di⁄erence
in di⁄erences framework with an interaction term between network strength and ￿nding a
network job, and focuses on the coe¢ cient of this interaction term. This strategy has an
important advantage over the standard method of regressing labor market outcomes on mea-
sures of network in￿ uence, in that it mitigates problems associated with omitted variables.
The model￿ s prediction is not rejected in any of the speci￿cations, and is strongly supported
for wages at the lower end of an individual￿ s acceptable wage distribution. This suggests that
the presence of at least one strong social tie in the recent immigrant￿ s immediate neighbor-
hood upon his arrival increases the number of o⁄ers he receives from the network, at least at
this end of the his acceptable wage distribution.
It is often argued that immigrants tend to cluster together because the presence of estab-
lished immigrants facilitates assimilation of new arrivals, both in the labor market and in the
social environment of the host country. We ￿nd that social networks help in the economic
assimilation of recent immigrants. Our ￿ndings suggest that immigrants with strong social
ties in their localities enjoy a faster arrival rate of jobs, at least at the lower end of their
wage distribution. Our paper does not address other issues related to immigrant dispersion,
including the longer term labor market e⁄ects of immigrant enclaves.
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25Table5: Network in￿ uence in ￿nding ￿rst jobs within ￿rst six months
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NJjHJ NJjHJ NJjHJ NJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.007 0.032 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.180** 0.320***
[0.014] [0.021] [0.016] [0.014] [0.074] [0.090]
Network Strength 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.114*** 0.093*** 0.025 -0.073 0.473**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.024] [0.026] [0.107] [0.187]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.003 -0.007 -0.013 -0.069 -0.060
[0.039] [0.036] [0.039] [0.168] [0.270]
Female -0.060** -0.068*** -0.075*** -0.247** -0.497***
[0.026] [0.019] [0.020] [0.107] [0.122]
Age 0.003 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.039*** -0.029***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005] [0.009]
Married -0.053** -0.036** -0.017 0.028 -0.165
[0.023] [0.018] [0.022] [0.115] [0.128]
Kids 0.031*** 0.020*** -0.002 -0.063 0.064
[0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.044] [0.039]
High school or less
1 0.104** 0.091*** 0.068*** 0.073 0.463***
[0.049] [0.034] [0.026] [0.184] [0.160]
University degree
1 -0.034 -0.042** -0.038** -0.122 -0.281***
[0.025] [0.018] [0.015] [0.089] [0.095]
Speak English well -0.097*** -0.067*** -0.017 0.077 -0.299***
[0.026] [0.019] [0.017] [0.095] [0.107]
Speak French well -0.124*** -0.051 0.028 0.298 -0.169
[0.047] [0.034] [0.039] [0.209] [0.244]
Lived in Canada Before -0.046 -0.021 0.046 0.298 0.068
[0.051] [0.036] [0.032] [0.187] [0.233]
Principal Applicant -0.020 -0.019 0.027 0.225 0.022
[0.030] [0.022] [0.029] [0.158] [0.151]
Sponsored by family 0.001 0.016 -0.004 -0.110 0.043
[0.046] [0.036] [0.039] [0.192] [0.233]
Family Visa
2 0.137** 0.067 -0.065 -0.563** -0.021
[0.063] [0.052] [0.058] [0.275] [0.322]
Refugee Visa
2 0.174** 0.073 -0.108 -1.007** -0.130
[0.079] [0.056] [0.073] [0.392] [0.325]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3524 3524 3437 4959 4982 4982
Log Pseudolikelihood
3 -2373.23 -2372.60 -2086.91 -2701.53 -2762.83 -4845.83
Clusters 326.00 326.00 318.00 380.00 383.00 383.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
26Table6: Network in￿uence in ￿nding ￿rst jobs within ￿rst two years
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NJjHJ NJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.024 0.039** 0.033*** 0.198** 0.313***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.010] [0.079] [0.095]
Network Strength 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.023 -0.019 0.512***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.019] [0.125] [0.182]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.003 0.008 -0.005 -0.043 0.022
[0.032] [0.033] [0.029] [0.211] [0.272]
Female -0.043* -0.050** -0.028* -0.120 -0.321**
[0.024] [0.023] [0.016] [0.115] [0.156]
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.040*** -0.035***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.008]
Married -0.042* -0.037* -0.005 0.053 -0.124
[0.023] [0.021] [0.016] [0.127] [0.147]
Kids 0.024** 0.022*** 0.002 -0.036 0.073
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.059] [0.056]
High school or less1 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.031 -0.106 0.422**
[0.049] [0.041] [0.022] [0.235] [0.214]
University degree1 -0.037* -0.052** -0.045*** -0.297** -0.454***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.015] [0.138] [0.142]
Speak English well -0.094*** -0.075*** -0.003 0.144 -0.242**
[0.021] [0.017] [0.014] [0.127] [0.122]
Speak French well -0.080* -0.038 0.024 0.284 -0.012
[0.042] [0.037] [0.025] [0.215] [0.257]
Lived in Canada Before -0.040 -0.032 0.020 0.255 0.035
[0.046] [0.039] [0.026] [0.235] [0.270]
Principal Applicant -0.023 -0.026 0.006 0.124 -0.034
[0.029] [0.026] [0.023] [0.193] [0.205]
Sponsored by family 0.042 0.062 0.038 0.231 0.466*
[0.040] [0.038] [0.026] [0.238] [0.277]
Family Visa2 0.077 0.026 -0.095** -0.831*** -0.514
[0.056] [0.050] [0.046] [0.307] [0.344]
Refugee Visa2 0.178** 0.123** -0.063 -0.908** -0.076
[0.072] [0.063] [0.059] [0.434] [0.387]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4122 4959 4950 4982
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -2507.72 -2886.17 -2032.66 -4533.34
Clusters 353.00 380.00 369.00 383.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters.
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
27Table7: Network in￿uence in ￿nding ￿rst jobs within ￿rst four years
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NJ NJ and HJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.020 0.031* 0.022** 0.147 0.246**
[0.018] [0.017] [0.009] [0.090] [0.101]
Network Strength 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.018 -0.000 0.442***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.015] [0.119] [0.170]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.082 -0.071
[0.030] [0.028] [0.023] [0.192] [0.228]
Female -0.044* -0.049** -0.019 -0.070 -0.279*
[0.023] [0.022] [0.014] [0.124] [0.151]
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.043*** -0.038***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.007]
Married -0.043* -0.032 0.009 0.175 -0.006
[0.024] [0.022] [0.017] [0.153] [0.163]
Kids 0.023** 0.022*** 0.002 -0.025 0.081
[0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.066] [0.060]
High school or less1 0.132*** 0.115*** 0.025 -0.136 0.393*
[0.047] [0.042] [0.020] [0.238] [0.233]
University degree1 -0.037* -0.045** -0.024* -0.159 -0.316**
[0.022] [0.020] [0.015] [0.156] [0.153]
Speak English well -0.096*** -0.084*** -0.015 0.042 -0.350***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.010] [0.105] [0.108]
Speak French well -0.036 -0.011 0.008 0.110 0.003
[0.044] [0.037] [0.023] [0.231] [0.241]
Lived in Canada Before -0.030 -0.020 0.014 0.166 0.042
[0.045] [0.039] [0.021] [0.219] [0.252]
Principal Applicant -0.031 -0.038 -0.007 -0.000 -0.171
[0.028] [0.026] [0.019] [0.196] [0.204]
Sponsored by family 0.041 0.062* 0.044* 0.365 0.576*
[0.039] [0.037] [0.026] [0.301] [0.329]
Family Visa2 0.078 0.028 -0.104** -0.966*** -0.634
[0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.363] [0.401]
Refugee Visa2 0.181*** 0.139** -0.060 -0.903** -0.066
[0.067] [0.060] [0.054] [0.435] [0.397]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4274 4982 4950 4982
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -2604.39 -2932.40 -1854.40 -4452.69
Clusters 359.00 383.00 369.00 383.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
28Table 8: Network in￿uence in ￿nding current/most recent job, at 6 month interview
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NJjHJ NJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.023 0.037** 0.050*** 0.196*** 0.297***
[0.023] [0.017] [0.014] [0.074] [0.090]
Network Strength 0.112*** 0.092*** 0.025 -0.072 0.468**
[0.029] [0.025] [0.025] [0.101] [0.192]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.003 -0.002 -0.015 -0.086 -0.044
[0.040] [0.037] [0.039] [0.166] [0.265]
Female -0.037 -0.053*** -0.075*** -0.282** -0.439***
[0.024] [0.018] [0.019] [0.110] [0.110]
Age 0.003* -0.001 -0.007*** -0.039*** -0.027***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005] [0.009]
Married -0.038 -0.026 -0.012 0.027 -0.11
[0.024] [0.017] [0.021] [0.119] [0.111]
Kids 0.026*** 0.017** -0.002 -0.056 0.052
[0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.044] [0.039]
High school or less1 0.088** 0.084*** 0.067** 0.104 0.445***
[0.044] [0.031] [0.027] [0.183] [0.159]
University degree1 -0.037 -0.043** -0.039*** -0.126 -0.284***
[0.023] [0.017] [0.015] [0.089] [0.092]
Speak English well -0.103*** -0.073*** -0.016 0.097 -0.312***
[0.027] [0.020] [0.017] [0.097] [0.109]
Speak French well -0.118** -0.047 0.026 0.274 -0.145
[0.048] [0.036] [0.041] [0.216] [0.243]
Lived in Canada Before -0.013 0.002 0.054* 0.300* 0.204
[0.048] [0.036] [0.032] [0.182] [0.229]
Principal Applicant 0.003 -0.001 0.032 0.2 0.104
[0.032] [0.023] [0.029] [0.166] [0.148]
Sponsored by family 0.012 0.024 -0.002 -0.127 0.076
[0.050] [0.039] [0.039] [0.185] [0.237]
Family Visa2 0.115 0.045 -0.074 -0.548* -0.122
[0.072] [0.055] [0.058] [0.288] [0.323]
Refugee Visa2 0.158** 0.054 -0.113 -0.999** -0.213
[0.078] [0.054] [0.073] [0.397] [0.318]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3449 4979 5003 5003
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -2105.38 -2734.46 -2780.46 -4881.94
Clusters 319 382 385 385
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
29Table 9: Network in￿uence in ￿nding current/most recent job, at 2 year interview
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NJjHJ NJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.017 0.026 0.018* 0.244 0.315*
[0.023] [0.021] [0.010] [0.153] [0.173]
Network Strength 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.017 0.006 0.574**
[0.028] [0.025] [0.019] [0.246] [0.253]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.051 0.060 -0.001 -0.046 0.225
[0.048] [0.044] [0.026] [0.380] [0.403]
Female -0.023 -0.035* -0.031*** -0.373** -0.476***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.011] [0.169] [0.172]
Age 0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.031** -0.031**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.013] [0.014]
Married -0.029 -0.027 -0.006 0.010 -0.101
[0.035] [0.033] [0.014] [0.220] [0.246]
Kids 0.033*** 0.028*** -0.005 -0.144 0.002
[0.011] [0.010] [0.006] [0.097] [0.089]
High school or less1 0.071 0.068 0.014 0.056 0.337
[0.045] [0.045] [0.021] [0.358] [0.373]
University degree1 -0.095*** -0.107*** -0.034*** -0.366* -0.772***
[0.026] [0.024] [0.010] [0.194] [0.193]
Speak English well -0.152*** -0.127*** 0.017 0.516*** -0.115
[0.023] [0.022] [0.011] [0.166] [0.171]
Speak French well -0.049 -0.024 0.010 0.223 0.011
[0.055] [0.049] [0.017] [0.295] [0.295]
Lived in Canada Before 0.020 0.012 0.008 0.190 0.237
[0.055] [0.049] [0.023] [0.393] [0.407]
Principal Applicant -0.014 -0.004 0.017 0.309 0.217
[0.035] [0.033] [0.017] [0.241] [0.258]
Sponsored by family 0.068* 0.061* -0.014 -0.340 -0.004
[0.038] [0.036] [0.018] [0.253] [0.261]
Family Visa2 0.038 0.012 -0.033 -0.564 -0.416
[0.062] [0.059] [0.031] [0.354] [0.390]
Refugee Visa2 0.200** 0.141* -0.037 -1.010* -0.076
[0.095] [0.082] [0.046] [0.544] [0.533]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3183 3524 3322 3524
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -1936.86 -2099.86 -904.40 -2845.99
Clusters 298.00 312.00 250.00 312.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
30Table 10: Network in￿uence in ￿nding current/most recent job, at 4 year interview
Probit Marginal E⁄ects Multinomial Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NJjHJ NJ HJ FJ NJ
Network Size 0.020 0.023 0.008 0.309 0.392
[0.023] [0.022] [0.008] [0.305] [0.320]
Network Strength 0.032 0.039 0.001 0.046 0.208
[0.037] [0.034] [0.009] [0.312] [0.286]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.027 -0.020 0.004 0.243 0.157
[0.050] [0.047] [0.013] [0.558] [0.555]
Female -0.042 -0.053* -0.028*** -0.773** -0.961***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.009] [0.321] [0.356]
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.036* -0.040**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.020] [0.020]
Married -0.048 -0.031 0.020 0.713* 0.520
[0.031] [0.031] [0.017] [0.398] [0.436]
Kids 0.043*** 0.037*** -0.005 -0.263 -0.070
[0.013] [0.012] [0.004] [0.163] [0.147]
High school or less1 0.105** 0.094* -0.003 -0.274 0.150
[0.049] [0.052] [0.015] [0.481] [0.568]
University degree1 -0.061** -0.065** -0.008 -0.249 -0.511
[0.027] [0.027] [0.009] [0.365] [0.392]
Speak English well -0.123*** -0.113*** -0.001 0.252 -0.266
[0.028] [0.026] [0.007] [0.281] [0.263]
Speak French well -0.023 -0.020 -0.008 -0.249 -0.331
[0.065] [0.062] [0.016] [0.444] [0.473]
Lived in Canada Before 0.071 0.066 0.003 0.002 0.320
[0.058] [0.057] [0.016] [0.612] [0.666]
Principal Applicant -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.009 -0.194 -0.516
[0.027] [0.028] [0.007] [0.312] [0.333]
Sponsored by family 0.158*** 0.154*** -0.001 -0.322 0.389
[0.057] [0.053] [0.019] [0.772] [0.716]
Family Visa2 -0.035 -0.038 -0.009 -0.346 -0.498
[0.075] [0.070] [0.027] [0.945] [0.881]
Refugee Visa2 0.075 0.107 0.015 0.632 1.015
[0.115] [0.107] [0.009] [0.809] [0.748]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2474 2585 2083 2585
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -1501.89 -1557.18 -336.05 -1850.08
Clusters 241.00 246.00 121.00 246.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 The word "pseudolikelihood" instead of likelihood is to stress the point that by specifying
the -cluster- option we no longer have independent observations but rather independent clusters
NJ: Network Job, HJ: Have a Job, FJ: Formal Job
31Table11: Unemployment Duration, Dependent variable: log(days till ￿rst job)
Censored Normal Regression
Censored at Six months Two Years Four Years
(1) (2) (3)
Network Size -0.165*** -0.169*** -0.157***
[0.047] [0.049] [0.048]
Network Strength -0.059 -0.037 -0.028
[0.061] [0.063] [0.062]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.068 0.071 0.058
[0.090] [0.094] [0.093]
Female 0.245*** 0.287*** 0.303***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.046]
Age 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Married 0.100* 0.104* 0.079
[0.058] [0.060] [0.059]
Kids 0.014 0.032 0.033
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024]
Speak English well 0.089* 0.010 0.015
[0.047] [0.049] [0.048]
Speak French well -0.097 -0.104 -0.072
[0.119] [0.122] [0.120]
Lived in Canada Before -0.283*** -0.277*** -0.337***
[0.099] [0.103] [0.102]
Sponsored by family -0.086 0.058 0.054
[0.100] [0.102] [0.100]
Principal Applicant -0.011 -0.048 0.013
[0.076] [0.079] [0.078]
Family Visa1 0.178 0.049 -0.038
[0.126] [0.130] [0.128]
Refugee Visa1 0.470*** 0.322* 0.105
[0.179] [0.183] [0.181]
High school or less2 -0.238*** -0.241*** -0.220***
[0.078] [0.080] [0.079]
University degree2 0.098* 0.117** 0.104*
[0.057] [0.058] [0.057]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes
CMA/CA dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country of birth dummies Yes Yes Yes
Month of landing dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4695 4185 4097
Log Likelihood -6244.78 -6645.44 -6545.09
Standard errors in brackets
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
2 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
32Table 12: Wage Regressions for ￿rst jobs within six months- Di⁄erence in Di⁄erences
Dependent Variable: Log(weekly wage)
OLS Quantile regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75
includes unemployed1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Size -0.036 -0.044 -0.020 -0.059 0.181 -0.046
[0.029] [0.058] [0.038] [0.041] [0.205] [0.050]
Network Strength 0.056 0.094* 0.047* 0.044 0.070 0.063
[0.038] [0.048] [0.024] [0.038] [0.049] [0.039]
Median wage in network 0.003 -0.009 -0.007* -0.009 -0.004 -0.008
(000s per annum) [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.075 0.024 0.028 0.114** 0.028 0.055
[0.063] [0.073] [0.035] [0.054] [0.071] [0.056]
Female -0.214*** -0.246*** -0.117*** -0.164*** -0.231*** -0.182***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.036] [0.027] [0.036] [0.029]
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.002** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Married -0.017 -0.008 -0.028 -0.036 -0.020 -0.040
[0.045] [0.045] [0.027] [0.035] [0.047] [0.037]
Kids -0.026** -0.016 -0.001 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012
[0.013] [0.018] [0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.015]
High school or less2 0.143*** 0.072 0.049* 0.080* 0.185*** 0.100**
[0.034] [0.054] [0.027] [0.041] [0.058] [0.045]
University degree2 0.029 -0.014 -0.005 -0.007 0.009 -0.033
[0.035] [0.043] [0.021] [0.033] [0.044] [0.035]
Speak English well 0.068** -0.035 0.040** 0.083*** -0.034 0.070**
[0.034] [0.037] [0.018] [0.028] [0.037] [0.029]
Speak French well -0.162 -0.044 -0.179*** -0.106 0.010 -0.152**
[0.098] [0.090] [0.046] [0.070] [0.090] [0.070]
Lived in Canada Before 0.085 0.039 0.053 0.144** 0.096 0.131**
[0.081] [0.072] [0.037] [0.059] [0.074] [0.061]
Principal Applicant 0.055 0.060 -0.001 -0.025 0.131** 0.007
[0.049] [0.058] [0.028] [0.043] [0.057] [0.044]
Sponsored by family 0.070 0.045 -0.016 -0.075 -0.019 -0.045
[0.055] [0.079] [0.039] [0.058] [0.078] [0.056]
Family Visa3 -0.200*** -0.154 -0.018 0.009 -0.182* -0.028
[0.069] [0.097] [0.047] [0.071] [0.097] [0.071]
Refugee Visa3 -0.251** -0.181 -0.057 -0.122 -0.255** -0.154
[0.098] [0.122] [0.063] [0.097] [0.121] [0.099]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3207 3207 3207 3207 4659 4659
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets
For OLS, R-squared is 0.15 and number of clusters is 268.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1. Very low wages were assigned to those who are unemployed and they were then included
in the quantile regressions
2 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
3 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
33Table 13: Wage Regressions for ￿rst jobs within two years- Di⁄erence in Di⁄erences
Dependent Variable: Log(weekly wage)
OLS Quantile regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network Size -0.043 -0.024 -0.045 -0.059
[0.028] [0.057] [0.035] [0.042]
Network Strength 0.022 0.065* 0.033 0.046
[0.036] [0.036] [0.029] [0.036]
Median wage in network 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.034 -0.021 -0.020 0.096*
[0.062] [0.053] [0.042] [0.051]
Female -0.203*** -0.241*** -0.137*** -0.151***
[0.029] [0.025] [0.020] [0.026]
Age -0.003* -0.002 -0.003** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Married 0.008 0.036 -0.011 -0.018
[0.038] [0.034] [0.027] [0.034]
Kids -0.029*** -0.032** -0.011 -0.020
[0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013]
High school or less1 0.129*** 0.111*** 0.044 0.064
[0.033] [0.040] [0.032] [0.040]
University degree1 0.054 0.026 0.020 0.036
[0.038] [0.031] [0.025] [0.032]
Speak English well 0.069** -0.027 0.054** 0.099***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.021] [0.026]
Speak French well -0.082 -0.009 -0.122** -0.077
[0.087] [0.063] [0.053] [0.068]
Lived in Canada Before 0.082 0.056 0.082* 0.129**
[0.080] [0.054] [0.044] [0.058]
Principal Applicant 0.038 0.036 0.004 -0.032
[0.048] [0.042] [0.033] [0.041]
Sponsored by family 0.062 0.033 -0.042 -0.019
[0.041] [0.055] [0.045] [0.055]
Family Visa2 -0.177*** -0.140** 0.006 -0.025
[0.062] [0.069] [0.055] [0.067]
Refugee Visa2 -0.200** -0.141* -0.062 -0.105
[0.085] [0.084] [0.072] [0.088]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3816 3816 3816 3816
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within
CMA/CA-country cells in brackets
For OLS, R-squared is 0.14 and number of clusters is 294.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
34Table 14: Wage Regressions for ￿rst jobs within four years- Di⁄erence in Di⁄erences
Dependent Variable: Log(weekly wage)
OLS Quantile regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network Size -0.036 -0.028 -0.048 -0.061
[0.028] [0.059] [0.035] [0.041]
Network Strength 0.022 0.073** 0.039* 0.039
[0.038] [0.035] [0.023] [0.039]
Median wage in network -0.001 -0.005 -0.006* -0.013**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.031 -0.023 -0.003 0.080
[0.061] [0.053] [0.034] [0.056]
Female -0.210*** -0.239*** -0.142*** -0.159***
[0.028] [0.025] [0.017] [0.028]
Age -0.003* -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Married 0.016 0.030 -0.007 -0.025
[0.038] [0.034] [0.022] [0.037]
Kids -0.031*** -0.029** -0.010 -0.020
[0.012] [0.013] [0.009] [0.014]
High school or less1 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.030 0.050
[0.034] [0.041] [0.027] [0.043]
University degree1 0.064* 0.027 0.023 0.050
[0.038] [0.032] [0.021] [0.034]
Speak English well 0.065** -0.014 0.052*** 0.103***
[0.025] [0.027] [0.017] [0.028]
Speak French well -0.055 -0.025 -0.068 -0.036
[0.089] [0.063] [0.043] [0.070]
Lived in Canada Before 0.041 0.021 0.031 0.084
[0.079] [0.054] [0.036] [0.061]
Principal Applicant 0.043 0.030 -0.003 -0.016
[0.047] [0.042] [0.027] [0.044]
Sponsored by family 0.075* 0.044 -0.008 -0.007
[0.042] [0.055] [0.037] [0.060]
Family Visa2 -0.214*** -0.153** -0.020 -0.060
[0.063] [0.070] [0.045] [0.073]
Refugee Visa2 -0.220*** -0.134 -0.081 -0.167*
[0.085] [0.086] [0.058] [0.093]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3946 3946 3946 3946
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within
CMA/CA-country cells in brackets
For OLS, R-squared is 0.14 and number of clusters is 298.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
35Table 15: Wage Regressions augmented with interaction of method of job ￿nding
and network strength, for ￿rst jobs within six months-Dependent variable: Log(weekly wages)
OLS Quantile Regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network size -0.036 -0.041 -0.021 -0.054
[0.029] [0.057] [0.038] [0.041]
Network Strength 0.068 0.128*** 0.064** 0.052
[0.045] [0.049] [0.031] [0.044]
Network Job -0.002 0.172** 0.023 -0.031
[0.047] [0.067] [0.044] [0.061]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.032 -0.164** -0.028 -0.026
[0.053] [0.072] [0.047] [0.065]
Median wage in network 0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008
(000s per annum) [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.074 0.019 0.051 0.109*
[0.062] [0.062] [0.041] [0.056]
Female -0.215*** -0.239*** -0.152*** -0.163***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.020] [0.028]
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.003** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Married -0.018 -0.002 -0.028 -0.048
[0.045] [0.040] [0.026] [0.036]
Kids -0.025* -0.026* -0.012 -0.007
[0.013] [0.016] [0.010] [0.014]
High school or less1 0.146*** 0.058 0.051* 0.070*
[0.033] [0.046] [0.031] [0.042]
University degree1 0.027 -0.015 -0.003 -0.009
[0.036] [0.037] [0.024] [0.034]
Speak English well 0.065** -0.039 0.041** 0.073**
[0.033] [0.032] [0.021] [0.028]
Speak French well -0.166* -0.067 -0.183*** -0.084
[0.098] [0.078] [0.053] [0.072]
Lived in Canada Before 0.084 0.040 0.059 0.140**
[0.081] [0.062] [0.043] [0.060]
Principal Applicant 0.055 0.066 -0.001 -0.037
[0.049] [0.050] [0.032] [0.043]
Sponsored by family 0.070 0.046 -0.049 -0.065
[0.055] [0.067] [0.044] [0.060]
Family Visa2 -0.196*** -0.168** 0.015 0.017
[0.070] [0.082] [0.054] [0.072]
Refugee Visa2 -0.245** -0.186* -0.030 -0.151
[0.097] [0.106] [0.073] [0.100]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3207 3207 3207 3207
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country
cells in brackets. For OLS, R-squared is 0.15 and number of clusters is 268.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
36Table 16: Wage Regressions augmented with interaction of method of job ￿nding
and network strength, for ￿rst jobs within two years-Dependent variable: Log(weekly wages)
OLS Quantile Regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network Size -0.042 -0.024 -0.044 -0.061
[0.028] [0.057] [0.035] [0.042]
Network Strength 0.032 0.101** 0.044 0.054
[0.045] [0.045] [0.037] [0.043]
Network Job -0.043 0.133** -0.013 -0.069
[0.049] [0.063] [0.051] [0.057]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.014 -0.142** -0.022 -0.029
[0.059] [0.067] [0.055] [0.062]
Median wage in network 0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.013**
(000s per annum) [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.033 -0.020 -0.010 0.097*
[0.062] [0.059] [0.047] [0.053]
Female -0.205*** -0.243*** -0.137*** -0.147***
[0.029] [0.028] [0.023] [0.027]
Age -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Married 0.007 0.033 -0.003 -0.028
[0.039] [0.038] [0.030] [0.035]
Kids -0.028** -0.032** -0.011 -0.015
[0.011] [0.015] [0.012] [0.014]
High school or less1 0.135*** 0.103** 0.049 0.050
[0.032] [0.045] [0.037] [0.041]
University degree1 0.051 0.024 0.015 0.015
[0.039] [0.035] [0.029] [0.033]
Speak English well 0.064** -0.036 0.043* 0.086***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.024] [0.027]
Speak French well -0.087 -0.033 -0.125** -0.081
[0.087] [0.070] [0.060] [0.071]
Lived in Canada Before 0.080 0.058 0.073 0.140**
[0.081] [0.058] [0.050] [0.060]
Principal Applicant 0.036 0.036 0.004 -0.021
[0.048] [0.048] [0.038] [0.043]
Sponsored by family 0.065 0.038 -0.041 -0.012
[0.042] [0.063] [0.051] [0.058]
Family Visa2 -0.173*** -0.140* -0.007 -0.040
[0.062] [0.079] [0.063] [0.070]
Refugee Visa2 -0.191** -0.131 -0.063 -0.157*
[0.085] [0.100] [0.082] [0.091]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3816 3816 3816 3816
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country
cells in brackets. For OLS, R-squared is 0.14 and number of clusters is 294.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
37Table 17: Wage Regressions augmented with interaction of method of job ￿nding
and network strength, for ￿rst jobs within four years-Dependent variable: Log(weekly wages)
OLS Quantile Regressions
Quantile Number 0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network Size -0.036 -0.028 -0.049 -0.050
[0.028] [0.059] [0.035] [0.040]
Network Strength 0.031 0.117** 0.056* 0.055
[0.047] [0.048] [0.030] [0.045]
Network Job -0.044 0.115* -0.009 -0.074
[0.050] [0.065] [0.042] [0.061]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.013 -0.129* -0.030 -0.025
[0.061] [0.070] [0.045] [0.066]
Median wage in network -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.014**
(000s per annum) [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.030 -0.018 0.005 0.096*
[0.061] [0.062] [0.039] [0.058]
Female -0.212*** -0.235*** -0.150*** -0.159***
[0.029] [0.030] [0.019] [0.029]
Age -0.003* -0.001 -0.002** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Married 0.014 0.036 -0.003 -0.015
[0.039] [0.040] [0.025] [0.038]
Kids -0.030*** -0.034** -0.012 -0.019
[0.012] [0.015] [0.010] [0.015]
High school or less1 0.127*** 0.103** 0.031 0.060
[0.032] [0.047] [0.031] [0.045]
University degree1 0.061 0.031 0.025 0.040
[0.038] [0.037] [0.024] [0.035]
Speak English well 0.060** -0.030 0.039* 0.099***
[0.025] [0.032] [0.020] [0.029]
Speak French well -0.057 -0.027 -0.075 -0.061
[0.089] [0.073] [0.049] [0.072]
Lived in Canada Before 0.040 0.024 0.048 0.110*
[0.079] [0.062] [0.041] [0.063]
Principal Applicant 0.041 0.027 0.004 -0.024
[0.047] [0.050] [0.031] [0.046]
Sponsored by family 0.078* 0.049 -0.007 -0.008
[0.043] [0.063] [0.042] [0.063]
Family Visa2 -0.210*** -0.153* -0.039 -0.043
[0.063] [0.080] [0.052] [0.076]
Refugee Visa2 -0.211** -0.126 -0.107 -0.151
[0.084] [0.099] [0.066] [0.095]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3946 3946 3946 3946
For OLS, robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country
cells in brackets. For OLS, R-squared is 0.14 and number of clusters is 298.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
38Table 18: Skill Change between First Job in Canada and Job before Migration
Highest Skill Immigrants only
Dependent variable: 1=No Change 0=Decrease in Skill Level
Probit, Marginal E⁄ects
For jobs within Six months Two Years Four Years
(1) (2) (3)
Network Size -0.024 -0.041 -0.041
[0.034] [0.027] [0.026]
Network Strength -0.004 0.007 0.014
[0.050] [0.051] [0.051]
Median wage in network 0.014* 0.018*** 0.018***
(000s per annum) [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.008 -0.015 -0.009
[0.063] [0.064] [0.067]
Female 0.029 0.060* 0.067**
[0.031] [0.033] [0.033]
Age -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Married -0.015 -0.005 -0.001
[0.032] [0.027] [0.029]
Kids -0.034** -0.041*** -0.039***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014]
Speak English well 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.112***
[0.031] [0.028] [0.027]
Speak French well -0.056 -0.021 -0.024
[0.057] [0.066] [0.068]
Lived in Canada Before 0.399*** 0.353*** 0.350***
[0.080] [0.079] [0.080]
Sponsored by family 0.115 0.133 0.132
[0.163] [0.108] [0.108]
Principal Applicant 0.137** 0.097** 0.102**
[0.056] [0.047] [0.047]
Family Visa1 -0.190*** -0.197** -0.202**
[0.060] [0.081] [0.080]
University degree2 0.050 0.042 0.048
[0.090] [0.076] [0.075]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1054 1303 1337
Log Pseudolikelihood -502.37 -671.84 -694.34
Clusters 112.00 127.00 127.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country groups
in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
2 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
39Table 19: Skill Change between First Job in Canada and Job before Migration
Highest Skill Immigrants only
Dependent variable: 1=No Change 0=Decrease in Skill Level
Probit, Marginal E⁄ects
For jobs within Six months Two Years Four Years
(1) (2) (3)
Network Size -0.016 -0.036 -0.038
[0.034] [0.027] [0.027]
Network Strength 0.014 0.020 0.021
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052]
Network Job -0.126*** -0.147*** -0.156***
[0.047] [0.048] [0.046]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.021 0.008 0.032
[0.055] [0.053] [0.054]
Median wage in network 0.014* 0.018** 0.019***
(000s per annum) [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.014 -0.014 -0.008
[0.063] [0.065] [0.068]
Female 0.018 0.052 0.061*
[0.030] [0.034] [0.034]
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Married -0.012 0.001 0.005
[0.030] [0.027] [0.028]
Kids -0.031* -0.040*** -0.039**
[0.017] [0.015] [0.015]
Speak English well 0.087*** 0.095*** 0.106***
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027]
Speak French well -0.066 -0.025 -0.028
[0.057] [0.069] [0.070]
Lived in Canada Before 0.403*** 0.349*** 0.347***
[0.084] [0.085] [0.086]
Sponsored by family 0.119 0.155 0.151
[0.166] [0.111] [0.109]
Principal Applicant 0.117** 0.078* 0.087*
[0.058] [0.046] [0.046]
Family Visa1 -0.183*** -0.202*** -0.206***
[0.063] [0.074] [0.075]
University degree2 0.052 0.033 0.041
[0.087] [0.078] [0.076]
Observations 1054 1303 1337
Log Pseudolikelihood -490.53 -658.11 -681.90
Clusters 112.00 127.00 127.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group e⁄ects within CMA/CA-country groups
in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
2 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
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